AFRA: Argumentation framework with recursive attacks  by Baroni, Pietro et al.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 19–37Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / i jarAFRA: Argumentation framework with recursive attacks
Pietro Baroni, Federico Cerutti *, Massimiliano Giacomin, Giovanni Guida
Dip. di Ingegneria dell’Informazione, University of Brescia, Via Branze 38, I-25123 Brescia, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Available online 24 May 2010
Keywords:
Argumentation frameworks
Argumentation semantics
Argument attack relation0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2010 Elsevier Inc
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2010.05.004
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pietro.baroni@ing.unibs.it (P.
giovanni.guida@ing.unibs.it (G. Guida).The issue of representing attacks to attacks in argumentation is receiving an increasing
attention as a useful conceptual modelling tool in several contexts. In this paper we present
AFRA, a formalism encompassing unlimited recursive attacks within argumentation frame-
works. AFRA satisﬁes the basic requirements of deﬁnition simplicity and rigorous compat-
ibility with Dung’s theory of argumentation. This paper provides a complete development
of the AFRA formalism complemented by illustrative examples and a detailed comparison
with other recursive attack formalizations.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
An argumentation framework (AF in the following), as introduced in the seminal paper by Dung [1], is an abstract struc-
ture consisting of a set of elements, called arguments, whose origin, nature and possible internal organization is not speciﬁed,
and by a binary relation of attack on the set of arguments, whose meaning is not speciﬁed either. This abstract formalism has
been shown to encompass a large variety of more speciﬁc formalisms in areas ranging from nonmonotonic reasoning to logic
programming and game theory, and, as such, is widely regarded as a powerful tool for theoretical analysis. Several variations
of the original AF formalism have been proposed in the literature. On one hand, some approaches enrich the original frame-
work with additional concepts, necessary to modelling in a ‘‘natural” way speciﬁc reasoning situations. This is the case, for
instance, of preference-based argumentation [2,3], where a preference ordering among arguments is considered, of value-
based argumentation [4], where a value is associated to arguments in order to account for the concept of preference (an
investigation on the relations between preference-based and valued-based argumentation is given in [5]), of bipolar argu-
mentation [6,7], where a relation of support between arguments is considered besides that of attack, or of weighted argu-
ment systems [8], where a weight indicates the relative strength of attacks. On the other hand, some proposals investigate
generalized versions of the original AF deﬁnition (in particular, of the notion of attack), without introducing any additional
concept within the basic scheme, as in [9–11]. This paper lies in the latter line of investigation and pursues the goal of gen-
eralizing the AF notion of attack by allowing an attack, starting from an argument, to be directed not just towards an argu-
ment but also towards any other attack. This will be achieved by a recursive deﬁnition of the attack, that leads to the
proposal of a new framework called AFRA (argumentation framework with recursive attacks).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the basic notions and fundamental properties of Dung’s argumentation
framework. Section 3 introduces the deﬁnition of AFRA accompanied by a discussion of its motivations and objectives. In par-
ticular, AFRA is required to parallel the semantics notions of Dung’s theory and their fundamental properties while extending
them to recursive attacks in an intuitively plausible and formally simple way. Section 4 introduces the generalized version of
the basic notions of defeat, conﬂict-free set, acceptable argument, characteristic function, and admissible set showing that
the relevant requirements stated in Section 3 hold. Section 5 extends to AFRA the deﬁnitions of complete, grounded,. All rights reserved.
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hold. Sections 6 and 7 deal with further relationships between AFRA and AF. The former shows that when an AFRA coincides
with an AF (since no attacks to attacks are present) all the generalized AFRA notions are fully compatible with the original
ones. In the latter a method to express an AFRA as an AF is provided. Section 8 draws a detailed comparison of AFRAwith the
related formalisms Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) and Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF). Finally
Section 9 summarizes the main contributions of the paper and discusses directions for future research.
2. Background notions
In Dung’s theory an argumentation framework (AF) is a pair hA;!i where A is a set of arguments and ! #AA is a
binary relation on it. The terse intuition behind this formalism is that arguments may attack each other and useful formal
deﬁnitions and theoretical investigations may be built on this simple basis. In particular, the notions recalled in Deﬁnition
1 lie at the heart of the deﬁnitions of Dung’s argumentation semantics,1 each of them representing a formal way of determining
the conﬂict outcome [12].
Deﬁnition 1. Given an AF D ¼ hA;!i:
 a set U#A is D-conﬂict-free if 9=A;B 2 U s.t. (A,B) 2?;
 an argument A 2 A is D-acceptable with respect to a set U#A (or, equivalently, is defended by U) if 8B 2 A s.t.
ðB;AÞ 2!; 9C 2 U s.t. (C,B) 2?;
 the function FD : 2A ! 2A such that FDðUÞ ¼ fAjA is D-acceptable w:r:t: Ug is called the D-characteristic function of D;
 a set U#A is D-admissible if U is D-conﬂict-free and every element of U is D-acceptable with respect to U, i.e. U# FDðUÞ.
An argumentation semantics identiﬁes for any argumentation framework a set of extensions, namely sets of arguments
which are ‘‘collectively acceptable”, or, in other words, able to survive together the conﬂict represented by the attack rela-
tion: for instance arguments that belong to all of extensions can be considered skeptically justiﬁed, while arguments belong-
ing to at least an extension can be considered credulously justiﬁed. We recall that while the grounded and ideal semantics
always identify a unique extension for a given argumentation framework (called grounded and ideal extension, respectively),
the preferred, stable, and semi-stable semantics can identify several extensions (called preferred, stable, and semi-stable
extensions, respectively).2
Deﬁnition 2. Given an AF D ¼ hA;!i:
 a set U#A is a D-complete extension if U is D-admissible and 8A 2 A s.t. A is D-acceptable w.r.t. U, A 2 U;
 a set U#A is the D-grounded extension if U is the least (w.r.t. set inclusion) ﬁxed point3 of the D-characteristic function FD;
 a set U#A is a D-preferred extension if U is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-admissible set;
 a set U#A is a D-stable extension if U is D-conﬂict-free and 8A 2 A n U; 9B 2 U s.t. (B,A) 2?;
 a set U#A is a D-semi-stable extension if U is a D-complete extension with maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-range (given a
set U#A, the D-range of U , denoted as DrangeðUÞ, is U [ UDþ where UDþ ¼ fA 2 Aj9B 2 U s.t. (B,A) 2?});
 a set U#A is the D-ideal extension if U is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) D-ideal set (a set U#A is D-ideal if it is D-
admissible and 8E s.t. E is a D-preferred extension, U# E).
It is easy to note that any extension of the above semantics is a D-admissible set, that is, it is able to defend all of its argu-
ments (in the sense that arguments are D-acceptable w.r.t. the extension itself). The notion of acceptability and the related
notion of admissibility are supported by intuition and satisfy a set of fundamental properties which in turn entail several
desirable consequences, holding even in the inﬁnite case, such as the existence of preferred extensions as well as the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the grounded extension. These properties are recalled in the following proposition [1].
Proposition 1. Given an AF D ¼ hA;!i:
 the D-characteristic function preserves D-conﬂict-freeness, i.e. given a set U#A, if U is D-conﬂict-free then also FDðUÞ is D-con-
ﬂict-free;
 the D-characteristic function is monotonic, i.e. if U1#U2, then FDðU1Þ# FDðU2Þ;
 Dung’s fundamental lemma: given a D-admissible set U#A and two arguments A;A0 2 A that are D-acceptable w.r.t. U , it holds
that U0 ¼ U [ fAg is D-admissible and A0 is D-acceptable w.r.t. U0;
 the set of all admissible sets form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.1 The letter ‘‘D” preﬁxed to the terms introduced in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 denotes that they speciﬁcally refer to the Dung’s proposal.
2 The reader is referred to [13,14] for a detailed discussion and a comparison concerning the different semantics proposed in the literature.
3 It is shown in Theorem 25 of [1] that the grounded extension can be equivalently characterized as the least D-complete extension.
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In Dung’s theory, arguments are regarded as the only entities that may be in conﬂict with each other and may be defea-
sible. The issue of extending the framework in such a way as also attacks are allowed to feature these properties has recently
received signiﬁcant attention in the literature. In fact, enabling attacks to attacks and considering them defeasible turns out
to provide a useful and intuitively plausible formal counterpart to representation and reasoning patterns commonly adopted
in various contexts. For instance, an approach to reasoning about preferences based on attacks to attacks has been intro-
duced in [9] and extensively developed in [11]. In [15,16] attacks to attacks are considered in the context of reasoning about
coalitions, while in [17] attacks to attacks are discussed in connection with the notions of strength, support and temporal
dynamics.
The present paper contributes to the research line on formalizing attacks to attacks in argumentation by pursuing the
following main objectives:
 encompassing an unrestricted recursive notion of attack to attack;
 keeping the proposed formalism as simple as possible;
 encompassing Dung’s AF as a special case of the proposed formalism;
 ensuring compatibility between the semantics notions in the proposed formalism and those in Dung’s AF.
As to the ﬁrst point, in some previous proposals (e.g. [9,11]) only one level of recursion is allowed, i.e. attacks attacking
other attacks cannot in turn be attacked. While this choice may be justiﬁed in speciﬁc contexts (e.g. reasoning about pref-
erences), we aim at proposing a more general formalism which is able to accommodate various kinds of representation and
reasoning needs related to recursive attacks. In particular, further levels of recursive attacks can be considered in the area of
modelling decision processes as shown by the following example, which will be used throughout the paper to illustrate the
main concepts of the proposed approach.
Suppose Bob is deciding about his Christmas holidays and, as a general rule of thumb, he is willing to buy cheap last min-
ute offers. Suppose two such offers are available, one for a week in Gstaad and another for a week in Cuba. Then, using his
behavioral rule, Bob can build two arguments, one, let say G, whose premise is ‘‘There is a last minute offer for Gstaad” and
whose conclusion is ‘‘I should go to Gstaad”, the other, let say C, whose premise is ‘‘There is a last minute offer for Cuba” and
whose conclusion is ‘‘I should go to Cuba”. As the two choices are incompatible, G and C attack each other, a situation giving
rise to an undetermined choice. Suppose however that Bob has a preference P for skiing and knows that Gstaad is a renowned
ski resort. The point now is: how can we represent this preference? P might be represented implicitly by suppressing the
attack from C to G, but this is unsatisfactory, since it would prevent further reasoning on P, as described below. So let us con-
sider P as an argument whose premise is ‘‘Bob likes skiing” and whose conclusion is ‘‘If possible, Bob prefers a ski resort”. P
might then attack C, but this would not be sound since P is not actually in contrast with the existence of a good last minute
offer for Cuba and the fact that, according to Bob’s general behavioral rule, this provides him with a good reason for going to
Cuba. Thus, following [11], it seems more reasonable to represent P as attacking the attack from C to G, causing G to prevail.
Note that the attack from C to G is not suppressed, but only made ineffective, in the speciﬁc situation at hand, due to the
attack of P.
Assume now that Bob learns that there have been no snowfalls in Gstaad since one month and from this fact he derives
that it might not be possible to ski there. This argument (N), whose premise is ‘‘The weather report informs that in Gstaad
there were no snowfalls since one month” and whose conclusion is ‘‘It is not possible to ski in Gstaad”, does not affect neither
the existence of last minute offers for Gstaad nor Bob’s general preference for ski, rather it affects the ability of this prefer-
ence to affect the choice between Gstaad and Cuba. Thus argument N attacks the attack originated from P.
Suppose ﬁnally that eventually Bob is informed that in Gstaad it is anyway possible to ski, thanks to a good amount of
artiﬁcial snow. This leads to building an argument, let say A, which attacks N, thus in turn reinstating the attack originated
from P and intuitively supporting the choice of Gstaad. A graphical illustration of this example is provided in Fig. 1.
As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, alternative formalizations of this example not involving attacks to
attacks are possible. For instance, from the general preference for skiing, represented in the example by argument P, one
might derive a distinct and more speciﬁc argument P 0 representing the preference for Gstaad over Cuba. In this case argu-
ment P 0 (instead of P) would attack b through c and argument N would attack P 0 (instead of c) through d. Of course, the rep-
resentation adopted for this example – like any formal representation of a real situation – is a matter of modelling choice. In
general, we do not claim that there are indisputable, theoretical reasons for asserting that recursive attacks are strictly nec-
essary. Indeed, technically speaking, extended argumentation frameworks encompassing attacks to attacks do not feature an
augmented expressive power with respect to Dung’s formalism, as they can be translated into traditional argumentation
frameworks, as shown for instance in [11] and in Section 7 of the present paper. From a modelling point of view, however,
it can be observed that attacks to attacks offer a useful tool supporting a natural representation of some reasoning patterns.
As a further example, consider the case presented in [11] concerning two agents P and Q exchanging arguments about
weather forecasts (see Fig. 2). Argument A, asserted by agent P, can be synthesized as ‘‘Today will be dry in London since
the BBC forecast sunshine”, while agent Q asserts argument B ‘‘Today will be wet in London since CNN forecast rain”. Argu-
ments A and B have contradictory conclusions and therefore attack each other. Preferences may then be expressed by P and Q
Fig. 1. Bob’s last minute dilemma.
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CNN”, which expresses a preference for BBC, while Q may reply with an argument C 0 ‘‘However, statistically CNN are more
accurate forecasters than the BBC” expressing a preference for CNN. The two conﬂicting preferences attack each other and,
according to the preference modelling adopted in [11], C attacks the attack from B to A, while C 0 attacks the attack from A to
B. Agent Q may then state an argument E asserting that ‘‘Basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous and rational than
basing a comparison on your instincts about their relative trustworthiness”. As argument E expresses a preference for C 0 over
C, E attacks the attack from C to C 0. Now, in order to see how recursive attacks may play a role in this context, consider the
following additional argument F asserted by P: ‘‘However, BBC has recently changed its whether forecast model, no informa-
tion on the newmodel is available; therefore statistics on CNN loses prevalence over personal opinion about BBC”. F does not
attack neither C 0 that states the preference for CNN’s weather forecast over BBC’s one based upon statistics, nor E, which
states the general principle that basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous and rational than basing a comparison
on instincts. Obviously, it does not attack neither C, nor A, nor B. In fact, F attacks the assumption that E affects the attacks
between C and C 0: while it is generally accepted that basing a comparison on statistics is more rigorous that basing a com-
parison on personal intuition, in the case at hand, existing statistics are not decisive for a comparison between the accuracy
of CNN and BBC forecasts. In other words F provides a good reason for believing that E does not attack the attack from C to C 0
and this can be modelled as an attack from F to the attack originating from E. Therefore the situation remains undecided and
both attacks between A and B are still in force.
Given the kind of representation needs illustrated above, we pursue the second and third objectives stated at the begin-
ning of the section by introducing in a rather straightforward way the fundamental deﬁnition of our proposal, namely the
concept of argumentation framework with recursive attacks.
Deﬁnition 3 (AFRA). An argumentation framework with recursive attacks (AFRA) is a pair hA;Ri where:
 A is a set of arguments;
 R is a set of attacks, namely pairs ðA;XÞ s.t. A 2 A and (X 2 R or X 2 A).
Given an attack a ¼ ðA;XÞ 2 R, we say that A is the source of a, denoted as src(a) = A and X is the target of a, denoted as
trgðaÞ ¼ X .
When useful, we will denote an attack to attack explicitly showing all the recursive steps implied by its deﬁnition; for
instance (A, (B,C)) means (A,a) where a = (B,C).
The formalization of Bob’s last minute dilemma in terms of AFRA gives a simple illustration of the use of the formalism.
Example 1. (Bob’s last minute dilemma) Let CBob ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA where: A ¼ fC;G; P;N;Ag and R ¼ fa; b; c; d; g, with
a = (G,C), b = (C,G), c = (P,b), d = (N,c),  = (A,N).
As to our third objective, it can be noted that an AFRA is also an AF when R does not include pairs ðA;XÞ such that X 2 R.
The fourth high-level objective of ‘‘compatibility” concerns the AFRA semantics notions which will be introduced in Sec-
tions 4 and 5. The underlying idea is that the basic concepts of conﬂict-freeness, acceptability, admissibility and the various
proposals of extension-based semantics are formally introduced in the context of AFRA, by explicitly considering both argu-
ments and attacks. We remark in particular that, according to Deﬁnition 3, we regard attacks as entities which are rooted inFig. 2. The EAF for the weather forecast example (Fig. 3 in [11]).
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source argument too. This choice ensures preservation of the main lines of Dung’s well-established conceptual framework
for semantics deﬁnition, while anyway reﬂecting the extended (in a sense, empowered) role ascribed to attacks in AFRA,
in particular their defeasibility.
From a more formal perspective, the objective of ‘‘compatibility” leads to the following requirements:
 the fundamental properties listed in Proposition 1 should still hold for the parallel concepts introduced in the context of
AFRA;
 in the case where an AFRA is also an AF, a bijective correspondence between the semantics notions according to the two
formalisms should hold.
The deﬁnition of semantics notions for AFRA in accordance with the objectives discussed above is carried out in Sections 4
and 5.
4. Basic semantic notions for AFRA
4.1. Defeat and conﬂict-free sets
As a starting point for the deﬁnition of any semantics-related notion we consider the concept of defeat. According to the
role played by attacks in AFRA we introduce a notion of direct defeat which regards attacks, rather than their source argu-
ments, as the subjects able to defeat arguments or other attacks. This is also coherent with the fact that an attack can be
made ineffective by attacking the attack itself rather than its source.
Deﬁnition 4 (Direct defeat). Let hA;Ri be an AFRA; a 2 R, V 2 A [R : a directly defeats V iff V ¼ trgðaÞ.
Moreover, according to the idea that an attack is strictly related to its source, we introduce a notion of indirect defeat for
an attack, corresponding to the situation where its source receives a direct defeat.
Deﬁnition 5 (Indirect defeat). Let hA;Ri be an AFRA and a; b 2 R: if a directly defeats src(b) then a indirectly defeats b.Example 1 (continued). InCBob there are the following direct and indirect defeats: a directly defeats C; a indirectly defeats b;
b directly defeats G; b indirectly defeats a; c directly defeats b; d directly defeats c;  directly defeats N;  indirectly defeats d.
As a special, but signiﬁcant, situation note that in case of a self-attacking argument, exempliﬁed by the AFRA h{A},{a}iwith
a = (A,A), a directly defeats A and indirectly defeats itself.
Summing up, a defeat is either a direct or indirect defeat.
Deﬁnition 6 (Defeat). Let hA;Ri be an AFRA; a 2 R; V 2 A [R : a defeats V, denoted as a!RV, iff a directly or indirectly
defeats V.
The deﬁnition of conﬂict-free set follows directly, requiring the absence of defeats.
Deﬁnition 7 (Conﬂict-free set). Let hA;Ri be an AFRA, S#A [R is conﬂict-free iff 9=V;W 2 S s.t. V!RW.
The deﬁnition of conﬂict-free set for AFRA is formally quite similar to the corresponding one in AF but they feature sub-
stantial differences. A ﬁrst one, which is quite evident and common to other AFRA notions, concerns the fact that a set of
arguments and attacks, rather than just a set of arguments is considered. A slightly subtler one, related to the underlying
notion of defeat, consists in the fact that in AFRA every set of arguments U#A is conﬂict-free, since only the explicit con-
sideration of attacks gives rise to conﬂict in this approach. While this may sound peculiar according to the ‘‘traditional” view,
it is again coherent with the central role played by attacks and, as it will be seen later, does not prevent (indeed it enables)
the achievement of the compatibility requirement with AF.
Example 1 (continued). Consider S1 ¼ fG;Cg: as explained above, S1 is conﬂict-free as it does not explicitly include any
attack. On the other hand, the sets S2 ¼ fG; C;ag; S3 ¼ fG;C; bg; S4 ¼ fG;C;a; bg are not conﬂict-free. Note also that
Deﬁnition 7 encompasses sets consisting of attacks only. For instance the set S5 ¼ fa; bg is not conﬂict-free since a?R b (a
indirectly defeats b) and, analogously, b?R a.4.2. Acceptability and characteristic function
The deﬁnition of acceptability is formally very similar to the traditional one, apart from the fact of encompassing sets of
both arguments and attacks.
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defended by S) iff 8a 2 R s.t. a!RW 9b 2 S s.t. b?R a.
Note that while acceptability is deﬁned with reference to a set S possibly including both arguments and attacks, only at-
tacks are ‘‘effective” as far as acceptability is concerned. In fact it is easy to see that an element (either argument or attack) is
acceptable w.r.t. a set S if and only if it is acceptable w.r.t. to S \R.
Example 1 (continued). ConsideringCBob, it can be seen that G is acceptable w.r.t. {c} and w.r.t. {a}, while it is not acceptable
w.r.t. {P}. As other examples, b is acceptable w.r.t. {b,d}, and c is acceptable w.r.t. {}.
Lemma 1 shows that the acceptability of an attack implies the acceptability of its source, in accordance with the require-
ments mentioned in Section 3.
Lemma 1. Let hA;Ri be an AFRA and S#A [R. If an attack a 2 R is acceptable w.r.t S, then src(a) is acceptable w.r.t to S.Proof. Suppose src(a) = A is not acceptable w.r.t. S. Then, $b s.t. b?R A and 9= c 2 S s.t. c?R b. But since b?R A and A = src(a),
then b?R a; therefore a is not acceptable w.r.t. S. Contradiction. h
The deﬁnition of characteristic function parallels the traditional one.
Deﬁnition 9. The characteristic function FC of an AFRA C ¼ hA;Ri is deﬁned as follows:
FC : 2
A[R#2A[R
FCðSÞ ¼ fVjV is acceptable w:r:t: Sg
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the fundamental properties of preserving conﬂict-freeness and being monotonic hold for the
AFRA characteristic function, as required.Proposition 2. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. If S#A [R is conﬂict-free, then FCðSÞ is also conﬂict-free.Proof. Assume that there are a and V in FCðSÞ such that a!RV. By the acceptability of V, there exists b 2 S s.t. b?R a. Then,
by the acceptability of a there is b0 2 S s.t. b0 ?R b, contradicting the hypothesis that S is conﬂict-free. Therefore FCðSÞ is con-
ﬂict-free. hProposition 3. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. The Function FC is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion.Proof. Letting S#S0# ðA [ RÞ, we have to show that FCðSÞ#FCðS0Þ, i.e. that every V which is acceptable w.r.t. S is accept-
able w.r.t. S0. Suppose that V is acceptable w.r.t. S but not w.r.t. S0. Then, 9a 2 R s.t. a!RV and 9=b 2 S0 s.t. b?R a, which,
since S#S0, implies 9=b 2 S s.t. b?R a, which contradicts the hypothesis that V is acceptable w.r.t. S. h4.3. Admissibility
The deﬁnition of admissible sets in AFRA requires conﬂict-freeness and acceptability of all set elements, exactly as in AF.
Deﬁnition 10 (Admissibility). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA: S#A [R is admissible iff it is conﬂict–free and each element of S
is acceptable w.r.t. S (i.e. S#FCðSÞ).
As required, a parallel of Dung’s fundamental lemma holds in the context of AFRA.
Lemma 2 (Fundamental lemma). Let hA;Ri be an AFRA, S#A [R an admissible set and V;V0 2 A [R elements acceptable
w.r.t. S. Then:
1. S0 ¼ S [ fVg is admissible; and
2. V0 is acceptable w.r.t. S0.Proof
1. V is acceptable w.r.t. S therefore each element of S0 is acceptable w.r.t. S0. Suppose S0 is not conﬂict-free; therefore there
exists an element W 2 S such that either V!RW or W!RV. From the admissibility of S and the acceptability of V there
exists an element W 2 S such that W!RW or W!RV. Since S is conﬂict-free it follows that W!RV. But then from the
acceptability of V there must exist an element cW 2 S such that cW!RW. Contradiction.
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The following theorem completes the veriﬁcation that AFRA satisﬁes all the fundamental properties of Dung’s theory
listed in Proposition 1.
Theorem 1. Let C be an AFRA. The set of all admissible sets of C forms a complete partial order with respect to set inclusion.Proof. We have to prove that (i) the set of all admissible sets has a least element and (ii) each chain of admissible sets has a
least upper bound. Point (i) immediately follows from the fact that the empty set is admissible, therefore it is obviously the
least element. As for (ii), let X be a chain of admissible sets: we prove that S ¼ Sx2Xx is admissible, thus obviously a least
upper bound of X. First, S is conﬂict-free, otherwise 9U;V 2 S such that U!RV, entailing that $x 2X such that U;V 2 x and
contradicting the admissibility of x. Second, suppose that U 2 S and V!RU: we have to prove that 9W 2 S such thatW!RV.
The conclusion follows from the fact that $x 2X such that U 2 x, and since x is admissible 9W 2 x#S such that
W!RV. hExample 1 (continued). In CBob there are 40 admissible sets, denoted in the following as ASi. First observe that according to
Deﬁnition 10 the empty set is admissible for any AFRA, thus we have AS1 ¼ ;. As to sets consisting of arguments only, note
that only unattacked arguments can be admissible by themselves since in AFRA defense is carried out by attack elements (for
instance G requires a for its defense). Thus we have AS2 ¼ fPg; AS3 ¼ fAg, and of course their union AS6 ¼ fA; Pg (the
adopted numbering is in accordance with Fig. 3). Also singletons consisting of (directly or indirectly) unattacked attacks
and those able to defend themselves on their own are of course admissible, yielding AS4 ¼ fag and AS5 ¼ fg (note for
instance that d is indirectly defeated by  and it does not defend itself). Of course any set including only these individually
admissible elements is admissible too, giving rise to 11 further admissible sets: AS6 ¼ fA; Pg; AS9 ¼ fP; g; AS10 ¼
fA; g; AS11 ¼ fP; ag; AS12 ¼ fA; ag; AS13 ¼ f; ag; AS14 ¼ fP; ; ag; AS15 ¼ fA; ; ag; AS20 ¼ fA; P; ag; AS21 ¼ fA; P; g;
AS34 ¼ fA; P; ; ag.
Considering now defense by individually admissible attacks we note that  defends c by indirectly defeating d and a de-
fends G by indirectly defeating b, leading to AS7 ¼ f; cg; AS8 ¼ fG;ag. Of course the union of these two sets, being conﬂict-
free, is admissible too, leading to AS32 ¼ fG; ; c;ag. Adding other unattacked elements to any of these three sets preserves
admissibility, leading to the following 14 admissible sets: AS16 ¼ fG; ;ag; AS17 ¼ fP;G;ag; AS18 ¼ fA;G;ag; AS22 ¼
fP; ; cg; AS23 ¼ fA; ; cg; AS24 ¼ f; c; ag; AS25 ¼ fP;G; ; ag; AS26 ¼ fA;G; ; ag; AS33 ¼ fA; P;G; ag; AS27 ¼ fA; P; ; cg;
AS31 ¼ fA; ; c; ag; AS30 ¼ fP; ; c; ag: AS37 ¼ fA; P; ; c; ag; AS39 ¼ fA; P;G; ; ag.
Since c, being defended by , in turn defends G by directly defeating b, the set AS19 ¼ fG; ; cg is admissible. Again, adding
unattacked elements gives rise to the following 6 further admissible sets: AS28 ¼ fP;G; ; cg; AS29 ¼ fA;G; ; cg; AS35 ¼
fP;G; ; c;ag; AS36 ¼ fA;G; ; c;ag; AS38 ¼ fA; P;G; ; cg; AS40 ¼ fA; P;G; ; c;ag.
Fig. 3 shows the Hasse diagram (w.r.t. set inclusion) of the admissible sets listed above. Coherently with Theorem 1 this is
a complete partial order with the empty set as minimal element at the bottom (as for any AFRA and for any AF) and (at least)
one maximal admissible set, namely AS40.Fig. 3. Hasse diagram of admissible sets for Example 1.
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In this section we deﬁne and analyse the AFRA semantics corresponding to the ones listed in Deﬁnition 2.
5.1. Complete semantics
The notion of complete extension closely parallels the traditional one by requiring admissibility and the inclusion of any
acceptable argument.
Deﬁnition 11 (Complete extension). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. A set S#A [R is a complete extension if and only if S is
admissible and every element of A [R which is acceptable w.r.t. S belongs to S, i.e. FCðSÞ#S.
By inspection of Deﬁnitions 10 and 11 it is immediate to see that a complete extension can be equivalently characterized
as a conﬂict-free set S which is a ﬁxed point of FC, i.e. such that FCðSÞ ¼ S.
Example 1 (continued). In CBob there is exactly one complete extension: {A,P,G,,c,a}.
We introduce also a more articulated AFRA (shown in Fig. 4) which will be useful for illustration and comparison of the
semantics to be introduced in the following.
Example 2. Let bC ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA, where: A ¼ fA;B;C;D; E; F;Gg, and R ¼ fa; b; c; d; ;g; f; h; i;jg with a = (A,B),
b = (B,a), c = (C,a), d = (C,D),  = (E,d), g = (D,), f = (A,F), h = (F,A), i = (F,G), j = (G,G).
As to the complete extensions of bC, note ﬁrst that the unattacked elements are E, C and c and that c defends both B and b
by directly defeating a. It follows that {B,C,E,b,c} is a complete extension. Further note that h defends itself, F and i by
indirectly defeating f and, analogously, f defends itself and A by indirectly defeating h. This gives rise to two further complete
extensions, namely {B,C,E,F,b,c,h,i} and {A,B,C,E, b,c,f}. All other arguments and attacks in bC have no defense and hence do
not belong to any admissible set or complete extension.5.2. Grounded semantics
The deﬁnition of grounded semantics parallels Dung’s one: as in his approach, the basic properties of the characteristic
function (whose validity we have already proved also in the context of AFRA) ensure the uniqueness of the grounded exten-
sion and the fact that it can be equivalently characterized as the least complete extension.
Deﬁnition 12 (Grounded extension). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. The grounded extension of C is the least ﬁxed point of FC.Lemma 3. The grounded extension is the least complete extension.
The identiﬁcation of the grounded extension in Examples 1 and 2 follows easily.
Example 1 (continued). The grounded extension of CBob is {A,P,G,,c,a}.Example 2 (continued). The grounded extension of bC is {B,C,E,b,c}.5.3. Preferred semantics
As expected, preferred extensions are deﬁned as maximal admissible sets.Fig. 4. Graphical representation of Example 2.
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(w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 follow directly from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. For each admissible set S of C, there exists a preferred extension E of C such that S# E.Corollary 1. Every AFRA possesses at least one preferred extension.
It also holds that preferred extensions are complete (and hence can be equivalently characterized as maximal complete
extensions).
Lemma 4. Every preferred extension is a complete extension, but not vice versa.Proof. Let S be a preferred extension which is not complete, then 9V R S which is acceptable w.r.t. S and by the fundamental
lemma (Lemma 2) S [ fVg is admissible: but this contradicts the maximality of S. As to the other point, in Example 2 one of
the complete extensions is not preferred (see below). h
Maximal complete extensions are easily identiﬁed in Examples 1 and 2.
Example 1 (continued). In CBob the only preferred extension is the grounded extension, i.e. {A,P,G,,c,a}.Example 2 (continued). The preferred extensions of bC are {B,C,E,F,b,c,h,i} and {A,B,C,E,b,c,f}, while the complete (and
grounded) extension {B,C,E,b,c} is not preferred since it is not maximal w.r.t. set inclusion.5.4. Stable semantics
Stable semantics is based, as usual, on the idea that each extension attacks all elements not included in it.
Deﬁnition 14 (Stable extension). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. A set S#A [R is a stable extension of C if and only if S is
conﬂict-free and 8V 2 A [R;V R S; 9a 2 S s.t. a!RV.
Stable extensions are also preferred, but not vice versa. In particular, as in AF, there are cases where no extensions com-
plying with Deﬁnition 14 exist.
Lemma 5. Every stable extension is a preferred extension, but not vice versa.Proof. It is easy to see that each stable extension is a maximal complete extension, hence a preferred extension. To show
that the reverse does not hold, consider an AFRA consisting just of a self-defeating argument: C ¼ hA;Ri with
A ¼ fAg; R ¼ fðA;AÞg. The empty set is a preferred extension of C but clearly is not stable. hExample 1 (continued). The only stable extension of CBob is {A,P,G,,c,a}.Example 2 (continued). The two preferred extensions of bC are not stable. In particular neither of them includes nor defeats
the elements d, , g, and D.5.5. Semi-stable semantics
Semi-stable semantics [18] is based on the idea of prescribing the maximization of both the arguments included in an
extension and those attacked by it, i.e. of maximizing the extension range.
Deﬁnition 15 (Range). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA and let S#A [R be a set of arguments and attacks. The range of S,
denoted as rangeðSÞ, is deﬁned as S [ Sþ where Sþ ¼ fV 2 A [Rj9a 2 S s:t: a!RVg.Deﬁnition 16. (Semi-stable extension) Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA, a set S#A [R is a semi-stable extension iff S is a com-
plete extension with maximal (w.r.t set inclusion) range.
Proposition 4 summarizes the relations of semi-stable with stable and preferred semantics in AFRA, paralleling those
holding in AF.
Proposition 4. For any AFRA C ¼ hA;Ri
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2. every semi-stable extension is preferred but not vice versa.Proof. As to the ﬁrst point, note that, by deﬁnition, the range of any stable extension coincides withA [R, which is of course
the largest possible one. Moreover stable extensions are admissible sets by Lemma 5, hence the conclusion. As to the second
point, suppose a semi-stable extension S is not preferred, i.e. there is an admissible set S0 strictly including it: the range of S0
strictly includes the range of S, contradicting the hypothesis that S is a semi-stable extension. On the other hand there are
preferred extensions which are not semi-stable as in Example 2 (see below). hExample 1 (continued). The only semi-stable extension of CBob is {A,P,G,,c,a}.Example 2 (continued). Consider the preferred extensions of bC. Letting S ¼ fB;C; E; F; b; c; h; ig it holds Sþ ¼ fG;A;a; f;jg.
On the other hand letting S ¼ fA;B;C; E; b; c; fg it holds Sþ ¼ fF;a; h; ig. S is the only semi-stable extension of bC since
ðS [ SþÞ)ðS [ Sþ Þ.
5.6. Ideal semantics
Ideal semantics [19] considers the largest admissible set included in all preferred extensions.
Deﬁnition 17 (Ideal extension). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. A set S#A [R is ideal iff S is admissible and "P s.t. P is a
preferred extension of C, S#P. The ideal extension is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) ideal set.
Deﬁnition 17 anticipates the uniqueness of ideal extension shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The ideal extension is unique.Proof. Suppose that there are two distinct maximal ideal sets S and S0 complying with Deﬁnition 17. Now S [ S0 is included
in all the preferred extensions, hence it is conﬂict-free, and defends all its elements, hence it is also admissible. Therefore
S [ S0 is a larger ideal set than S and S0, contradicting the hypothesis. h
It can also be seen that the ideal extension includes all acceptable elements, i.e. it is a complete extension.
Lemma 6. The ideal extension is a complete extension.Proof. The ideal extension is admissible by deﬁnition, thus it is sufﬁcient to show that it includes any element V which is
acceptable w.r.t. it. Since the ideal extension is contained in any preferred extension, it is easy to see that V is acceptable w.r.t
any preferred extension too. By Lemma 4 the preferred extensions are also complete, therefore they must all include V. As a
consequence, V is included in the ideal extension, otherwise including it would give rise by the fundamental lemma (Lemma
2) to a strictly greater admissible set contained in all preferred extensions, contradicting the maximality of the ideal
extension. h
Since the grounded extension is included in all complete extensions (and hence in all preferred extensions) and is admis-
sible, the ideal extension is a (possibly strict) superset of the grounded extension.
Example 1 (continued). The ideal extension of CBob is {A,P,G,,c,a}.Example 2 (continued). The ideal extension of bC is {B,C,E,b,c}.6. Compatibility with AF
In this sectionwe prove the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement formally stated at the end of Section 3 for the case
where a given AFRA is an AF. To be precise, throughout this sectionwhen stating ‘‘letC ¼ hA;Ri be an AF”, wewill consider that
C is an AFRA such that attacks involve just arguments rather than being directed against other attacks (formally,R#AA).
First of all, it is easy to see that, in this case, a dual property holds w.r.t. Lemma 1.
Lemma 7. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AF and S# ðA [RÞ. If an argument A 2 A is acceptable w.r.t. S, then any a 2 R such that
src(a) = A is acceptable w.r.t. S.Proof. Weprove that a is defended by S from any attack. For any b such that b?R a, b does not directly attack a since hA;Ri is
anAF. As a consequence, itmust be the case that b?R src(a), i.e. b?R A: sinceA is acceptablew.r.t. S, then 9c 2 S s.t. c?R b. h
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context of the traditional Dung’s framework. Of course, this correspondence can only be established through a mapping,
since extensions in AFRA, differently from those in the traditional Dung’s framework, include both arguments and attacks.
Accordingly, Deﬁnition 18 provides a natural way to extend sets of arguments (corresponding to traditional extensions) into
sets of arguments and attacks (corresponding to AFRA extensions).
Deﬁnition 18 (?AFRA operator). Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA. Given a set of arguments U#A; U!AFRA,U [ fa 2 RjsrcðaÞ 2 Ug.
In words, given a set of arguments U#A, the ?AFRA operator completes U with all of the attacks arising from it. This
operator will play a key role in proving the satisfaction of compatibility requirements for all the considered semantics (Prop-
ositions 6–11). In fact, given a semantics R, the compatibility requirement (in the case where a given AFRA is an AF) will be
expressed as a bijective correspondence, through the?AFRA operator, between (i) extensions prescribed by R in the tradi-
tional AF formulation, and (ii) extensions prescribed by R in the AFRA formulation. More speciﬁcally, we will show for each
semantics R that if a set of arguments U is an AF extension according to R then U!AFRA is an AFRA extension according to R
and, vice versa, if a set of arguments and attacks S is an AFRA extension according toR then there is a set of arguments U such
that S ¼ U!AFRA and U is an AF extension according to R.
The use of the?AFRA operator to prove these correspondences is supported by Lemmas 1 and 7. The relevant properties
shown in Lemma 8 will be exploited in the following.
Lemma 8. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA, and let U1;U2#A two sets of arguments. It holds that:
1. U1#U2 iff U!AFRA1 #U!AFRA2 ;
2. U1(U2 iff U!AFRA1 (U!AFRA2 ;
3. U!AFRA1 [ U!AFRA2 ¼ ðU1 [ U2Þ!AFRA.Proof
1. As for the) direction, let V 2 U!AFRA1 . If V is an argument then by deﬁnition V 2 U1#U2 thus V also belongs to U!AFRA2 . In
the other case V 2 R and by deﬁnition 9A 2 U1 : A ¼ srcðVÞ, thus A 2 U2 and, again by deﬁnition, V 2 U!AFRA2 . As for the
other direction, if an argument A 2 U1 then it belongs to U!AFRA1 #U!AFRA2 , and since it is an argument then it must be
the case that A 2 U2.
2. Taking into account the previous point, for the ) direction we have just to show that, considering an argument A 2 U2
such that A R U1, it holds by deﬁnition that A 2 U!AFRA2 but A R U!AFRA1 , entailing that U!AFRA1 (U!AFRA2 . As for the other direc-
tion, by the hypothesis 9V 2 U!AFRA2 : V R U!AFRA1 . If V is an argument then by deﬁnition V 2 U2 and V R U1, if V 2 R then
these conditions hold for srcðVÞ: in any case, U1(U2.
3. V 2 ðU!AFRA1 [ U!AFRA2 Þ () V 2 U!AFRA1 or V 2 U!AFRA2 () V 2 U1 _ 9A 2 U1 : A ¼ srcðVÞ _ V 2 U2 _ 9B 2 U2 : B ¼ srcðVÞ ()
V 2 ðU1 [ U2Þ _ 9C 2 ðU1 [ U2Þ : C ¼ srcðVÞ () V 2 ðU1 [ U2Þ!AFRA. h
A key role in proving the satisfaction of the compatibility requirement is played by showing in Proposition 6 that the de-
sired bijective correspondence between AFRA and AF extensions holds for the case of complete semantics.
Proposition 6. LetC ¼ hA;Ri be an AF. Then, S is a complete extension ofC iff S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-complete extension ofC.Proof. )We ﬁrst show that S ¼ ðS \ AÞ!AFRA. In fact, for any V 2 S if V 2 A then it obviously belongs to ðS \ AÞ!AFRA. In the
other case, namely V 2 R; V is acceptable w.r.t. S since it belongs to S which is a complete extension, thus by Lemma 1
srcðVÞ 2 ðS \ AÞ, which by deﬁnition of the ?AFRA operator entails V 2 ðS \ AÞ!AFRA. On the other hand, for any
V 2 ðS \ AÞ!AFRA if V 2 A then it obviously belongs to S; in the other case srcðVÞ 2 S and V 2 S follows from Lemma 7 and
the fact that S is a complete extension.
According to this result, we have to show that ðS \ AÞ is a D-complete extension.
First, ðS \ AÞ is D-conﬂict-free, otherwise there would exist A;B 2 ðS \ AÞ with (A,B) 2?, i.e. letting a = (A,B) we would
have a?R B with src(a) = A: since both B and a belong to S ¼ ðS \ AÞ!AFRA; S would not be conﬂict-free, contradicting the
hypothesis.
Then, we show that ðS \ AÞ is D-admissible, i.e. given A 2 ðS \ AÞ, for any B 2 A such that ðB;AÞ 2! 9C 2 ðS \ AÞ such
that (C,B) 2?. Since (B,A) 2?, letting a = (B,A) yields a ?R A with src(a) = B. Since A 2 S and S is admissible by the
hypothesis, 9b 2 S : b!Ra, which taking into account that C is an AF yields b?R B. Since b 2 S ¼ ðS \ AÞ!AFRA, srcðbÞ 2 S, and
the thesis follows from (src(b),B) 2?.
Finally, we prove that ðS \ AÞ is D-complete by showing that, for any A 2 A which is D-acceptable w.r.t. ðS \ AÞ; A is
acceptable w.r.t. S: by the hypothesis that S is a complete extension it then follows that A 2 S, i.e. A 2 ðS \ AÞ. Let us then
consider an attack a 2 R such that a?R A. Obviously this is equivalent to (src(a),A) 2?, and since A is D-acceptable w.r.t.
ðS \ AÞ; 9B 2 ðS \ AÞ : ðB; srcðaÞÞ 2!. Letting b = (B,src(a)), we have b?R a, and since B 2 ðS \ AÞ then also
b 2 S ¼ ðS \ AÞ!AFRA. Summing up, for any a 2 R such that a!RA 9b 2 S such that b?R a.
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elements.
As to the ﬁrst point, assume by contradiction that 9a;V 2 U!AFRA such that a!RV. While a 2 R by deﬁnition, V either
belongs to A or to R. In the ﬁrst case we have ðsrcðaÞ;VÞ 2!, and by deﬁnition of U!AFRA both src(a) and V belong to U ,
contradicting the fact that U is D-conﬂict-free. In the other case, i.e. V is an attack, since C is an AF we have a!RsrcðVÞ, i.e.
ðsrcðaÞ; srcðVÞÞ 2!. But a;V 2 U!AFRA entails srcðaÞ; srcðVÞ 2 U, again contradicting the fact that U is D-conﬂict-free.
To show that U!AFRA is admissible, consider a generic V 2 U!AFRA and suppose that 9a 2 R such that a!RV. Taking into
account that C is an AF and that by deﬁnition U!AFRA includes the sources of all the attacks it includes, it is easy to see that
9A 2 U such that a?R A (where A is either V or srcðVÞ). Therefore (src(a),A) 2?, and since U is D-admissible
9B 2 U : ðB; srcðaÞÞ 2!. Letting b = (B,src(a)), we have b?R a and by deﬁnition of U!AFRA it is the case that b 2 U!AFRA.
Finally, we have to show that if V is acceptable w.r.t. U!AFRA then V 2 U!AFRA. If V is an argument, taking into account that
C is an AF, the conclusion follows from the D-completeness of U . If V is an attack, we prove that srcðVÞ is D-acceptable w.r.t.
U, which, taking into account that U is a D-complete extension, implies that srcðVÞ 2 U, in turn entailing V 2 U!AFRA by the
deﬁnition of U!AFRA. Thus, assume that there is A 2 A such that ðA; srcðVÞÞ 2!. Letting a ¼ ðA; srcðVÞÞ; a!RV and since V is
acceptable w.r.t. U!AFRA which is admissible by the previous point, there is b 2 U!AFRA such that b?R a. Since C is an AF it
must be the case that b?R A, obviously entailing that (src(b),A) 2? with srcðbÞ 2 U by the deﬁnition of U!AFRA. h
To exemplify this correspondence, consider the following example graphically represented in Fig. 5.
Example 3. Let C ¼ hfA;B;C;Dg; fa; b; c; d; ; fgi be an AFRA where: a = (A,B), b = (B,A), c = (A,C), d = (B,C),  = (C,D), f = (D,C).
C is clearly also an AF. The D-complete extensions of C are ;, {D}, {A,D}, {B,D} while the complete extensions (as deﬁned in
AFRA) are ;, {D,f}, {A,D,a,c,f}, {B,D,b,d,f}. It is easy to see that any D-complete extension can be extended to a corresponding
complete extension adding the attacks that arise from it (through the ?AFRA operator) and, conversely, that any complete
extension corresponds to a D-complete extension if we consider only the arguments included in it.
This result can be extended to prove an analogous correspondence between the preferred and the D-preferred extensions,
the grounded and the D-grounded extension, as well as the stable and the D-stable extensions.
Proposition 7. LetC ¼ hA;Ri be an AF. Then, S is a preferred extension ofC iff S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-preferred extension ofC.Proof. )If S is a preferred extension, then by Lemma 4 it is also a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 S ¼ U!AFRA
where U is a D-complete extension of C. Assume by contradiction that U is not a D-preferred extension of C: then there is a
D-preferred extension (which is also a complete extension) U0#A such that U(U0, entailing by Lemma 8(2) that
U!AFRA(U0!AFRA. Furthermore, Proposition 6 entails that U0!AFRA is a complete extension, and in particular an admissible
set: but this contradicts the fact that U!AFRA ¼ S is a preferred extension.
If U is a D-preferred extension of C it is in particular a D-complete extension, therefore Proposition 6 entails that
S ¼ U!AFRA is a complete extension of C. Assuming by contradiction that it is not maximal, by Theorem 2 and Lemma 4 there
is a complete extension S0 such that S(S0, and by Proposition 6 it turns out that S0 ¼ U0!AFRA where U0 is a D-complete
extension of C. However, S(S0 entails by Lemma 8(2) that U(U0, contradicting the fact that U is a D-preferred extension of
C. hProposition 8. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AF and let S be the grounded extension of C. Then, S ¼ U!AFRA where U is the D-grounded
extension of C.Proof. Since S is by deﬁnition a complete extension, by Proposition 6 it is the case that S ¼ U!AFRA with U a D-complete
extension of C. Assume by contradiction that U is not the least D-complete extension. Then, letting U0 the D-grounded exten-
sion of C, we have U0(U which by Lemma 8(2) entails that U0!AFRA(U!AFRA, where U0!AFRA is by Proposition 6 a complete
extension of C: but this contradicts the fact that S ¼ U!AFRA is the least complete extension of C. hProposition 9. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AF. Then, S is a stable extension of C iff S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-stable extension of C.Proof. )If S is a stable extension, then by Lemma 5 it is also a preferred and thus a complete extension, therefore by Prop-
osition 6 it is the case that S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-complete extension of C and in particular a conﬂict-free set. To see thatFig. 5. Graphical representation of Example 3.
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since S is a stable extension 9a 2 U!AFRA such that a?R A. The conclusion follows from the fact that, by deﬁnition of
U!AFRA; srcðaÞ 2 U , and (src(a), A) 2?.
 Since U is a D-stable extension of C and thus a D-complete extension, by Proposition 6 it holds that S ¼ U!AFRA is a
complete extension and thus a conﬂict-free set ofC. Let V be a generic element not belonging to S. If V 2 A then by deﬁnition
of U!AFRA it is the case that V R U, thus V 2 UDþ since U is a D-stable extension. If V 2 R then by deﬁnition of U!AFRA it holds
that srcðVÞ R U, thus again srcðVÞ 2 UDþ. In any case, $a with srcðaÞ 2 U such that a!RV, and the conclusion follows from the
fact that, by deﬁnition of U!AFRA; a 2 S. h
The relationships among D-preferred and preferred extensions, D-stable and stable extensions, and D-grounded and
grounded extensions can be easily identiﬁed in Example 3.
Example 3 (continued). {A,D} and {B,D} are both D-preferred and D-stable extensions of C, while {A,D,a,c,f} and {B,D,b,d,f}
are, correspondingly, both stable and preferred extensions as deﬁned in AFRA. The D-grounded extension of C is ; and
coincides with the grounded extension as deﬁned in AFRA (note that ;?AFRA = ;).
The bijective correspondence also holds for semi-stable semantics. To show this we have to ﬁrst prove a property con-
cerning the relationship between the ?AFRA operator and the range of a set.
Lemma 9. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AF and U#A a set of arguments. Then, rangeðU!AFRAÞ ¼ ðDrangeðUÞÞ!AFRA.Proof. By deﬁnition rangeðU!AFRAÞ ¼ U!AFRA [ fV 2 A [Rj9a 2 U!AFRA : a!RVg, i.e. U!AFRA [ fA 2 Aj9a 2 U!AFRA : a!RAg[
fb 2 Rj9a 2 U!AFRA : a!Rbg, which, taking into account that an attack a 2 U!AFRA iff srcðaÞ 2 U, is in turn equal to
U!AFRA [ UDþ [ fb 2 Rj9a 2 U!AFRA : a!Rbg. Since C is an AF, a?R b with b 2 R can only hold by indirect defeat, thus
rangeðU!AFRAÞ can be expressed as U!AFRA [ UDþ [ fb 2 RjsrcðbÞ 2 UDþg, i.e. U!AFRA [ ðUDþÞ!AFRA. Now, by Lemma 8(3) the last
expression is equal to ðU [ UDþÞ!AFRA, i.e. ðDrangeðUÞÞ!AFRA. hProposition 10. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AF. Then, S is a semi-stable extension of C iff S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-semi-stable exten-
sion of C.Proof. )Since S is a semi-stable extension of C, it is by deﬁnition also a complete extension, therefore by Proposition 6 it is
the case that S ¼ U!AFRA where U#A is a D-complete extension of C. Assume by contradiction that U is not a D-semi-stable
extension: then, there is a D-complete extension U0 of C; U0#A, such that DrangeðUÞ(DrangeðU0Þ, and letting S0  U0!AFRA
yields S0 a complete extension of C by Proposition 6. However, DrangeðUÞ(DrangeðU0Þ entails by Lemma 8(2) that
ðDrangeðUÞÞ!AFRA(ðDrangeðU0ÞÞ!AFRA, which according to Lemma 9 is equivalent to rangeðSÞ(rangeðS0Þ, contradicting the fact
that S is a semi-stable extension of C.
 Since U is a D-complete extension of C, by Proposition 6 it holds that S ¼ U!AFRA is a complete extension of C. Assume
by contradiction that it is not semi-stable: then, there is a complete extension S0# ðA [RÞ such that rangeðSÞ(rangeðS0Þ,
where according to Proposition 6 it is the case that S0 ¼ U0!AFRA with U0#A a D-complete extension of C. However, applying
Lemma 9 to rangeðSÞ(rangeðS0Þ yields ðDrangeðUÞÞ!AFRA(ðDrangeðU0ÞÞ!AFRA, which by Lemma 8(2) holds iff DrangeðUÞ(
DrangeðU0Þ, contradicting the fact that U is a D-semi-stable extension of C. h
In order to exemplify the relationship between D-semi-stable and semi-stable extensions, let us consider again Example 3.
Example 3 (continued). The D-semi-stable extensions of C are {A,D} and {B,D}, while {A,D,a,c,f} and {B,D,b,d,f} are,
correspondingly, its semi-stable extensions.
We ﬁnally provide the correspondence result for ideal semantics.
Proposition 11. LetC ¼ hA;Ribe anAF and letS be the ideal extension ofC. Then,S ¼ U!AFRA whereU is theD-ideal extension ofC.Proof. According to Lemma 6 S is a complete extension ofC, therefore, by Proposition 6, S ¼ U!AFRA where U is a D-complete
extension of C (thus in particular D-admissible). By Proposition 7, 8 E with E a D-preferred extension of C; E!AFRA is a pre-
ferred extension, thus by deﬁnition of ideal extension S ¼ U!AFRA# E!AFRA, which by Lemma 8(1) yields U# E. To show that U
is the D-ideal extension, we have to prove that U is the maximal subset of A satisfying the latter condition. Assume by con-
tradiction that this is not the case: then, there is a set U0#A such that U(U0 and U0 is a D-complete extension contained in all
the D-preferred extensions of C. By Lemma 8(2), S ¼ U!AFRA(U0!AFRA, where, according to Proposition 6, U0!AFRA is a complete
extension of C, thus admissible. Moreover, by Proposition 7 for any preferred extension P of CP ¼ E!AFRA with E a D-pre-
ferred extension of C, and since U0# E according to Lemma 8(1) we have that U0!AFRA# E!AFRA ¼ P. Summing up, there is an
admissible set, namely U0!AFRA, which is contained in all preferred extensions of C and such that S(U0!AFRA: but this contra-
dicts the fact that S is the ideal extension of C. h
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We consider now the issue of expressing an AFRA in terms of a traditional AF and drawing the relevant correspondences
concerning the notions introduced in Sections 4 and 5. This kind of correspondence provides a very useful basis for further
investigations as it allows one to reuse or adapt, in the context of AFRA, the large corpus of theoretical results available in
Dung’s framework, in particular as far as computational complexity is concerned.
Deﬁnition 19. Let C ¼ hA;Ri be an AFRA, the corresponding AF CAF ¼ h eA; eRi is deﬁned as follows:
 eA ¼ A [R;
 eR ¼ fðV;WÞjV;W 2 A [R and V!RWg.
In words, both arguments and attacks of the original AFRA C become arguments of its corresponding AF-version CAF,
while the defeat relations in AF correspond to all direct and indirect defeats in the original AFRA. We can now examine
the relationships between the relevant notions in C and CAF showing that they are all bijections as desirable.
Proposition 12. Let C ¼ hA;Ri an AFRA and CAF ¼ h eA; eRi its corresponding AF, S#A [R and V 2 A [R:
1. S is a conﬂict-free set for C iff S is a D-conﬂict-free set for CAF;
2. V is acceptable w.r.t. S#A [R in C iff V is D-acceptable w.r.t. S in CAF;
3. S is an admissible set for C iff S is a D-admissible set for CAF;
4. S is a preferred extension for C iff S is a D-preferred extension for CAF;
5. S is a stable extension for C iff S is a D-stable extension for CAF;
6. S is a complete extension for C iff S is a D-complete extension for CAF;
7. S is the grounded extension for C iff S is the D-grounded extension for CAF;
8. S is a semi-stable extension for C iff S is a D-semi-stable extension for CAF;
9. S is the ideal extension for C iff S is the D-ideal extension for CAF.Proof
1. The conclusion follows directly from Deﬁnition 19, taking into account Deﬁnitions 1 and 7.
2. ) Let V 2 A [R be acceptable w.r.t. S#V [R in C and suppose V is not D-acceptable w.r.t. S in CAF. So, there exists
B 2 eA ¼ A [R s.t. ðB;VÞ 2 eR and 9= C 2 S s.t. ðC;BÞ 2 eR. From Deﬁnition 19, ðB;VÞ 2 eR iff B!RV and ðC;BÞ 2 eR iff
C!RB. Then 9B 2 A [R s.t. B!RV and 9= C 2 S s.t. C!RB. Therefore V is not acceptable w.r.t. S in C. Contradiction.
 Follows the same reasoning line with obvious modiﬁcations.
3. Follows directly from 1 and 2.
4. It follows directly from 3 since both in AFRA (Deﬁnition 13) and in AF (Deﬁnition 2) preferred (D-preferred) extensions are
deﬁned as maximal w.r.t. set inclusion admissible (D-admissible) sets.
5. From 1 conﬂict-free sets are in correspondence between C and CAF. From Deﬁnition 19, it is easy to see that if
8V 2 A [R;V R S; 9B 2 S s.t.B!RV (Deﬁnition 14) then also 8A 2 eA n S; 9B 2 S s.t. (B,A) 2? (Deﬁnition 2) and vice versa.
6. From 2 it follows that the characteristic function FC of C is equal to the D-characteristic function FCAF of its corresponding
AF CAF. Then the conclusion follows from 3, taking into account Deﬁnitions 11 and 2.
7. It follows from 6 as the grounded extension is the least complete (D-complete) extension both in AFRA (Lemma 3) and in
AF (Deﬁnition 2).
8. It follows from 6, taking into account Deﬁnitions 16 and 2 and noting that, in virtue of Deﬁnition 19, the range of a set S in
AFRA (Deﬁnition 15) is equal to the D-range of S in CAF (Deﬁnition 2).
9. It follows directly from 3 and 4. h
8. Comparison with related works
8.1. The Extended Argumentation Framework
In recent years a generalization of Dung’s framework to encompass attacks to attacks has been proposed in [9,11], called
Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF). This approach is motivated by the need to express preferences between argu-
ments and supports a very interesting form of meta-level argumentation about the values that arguments promote. In
EAF a limited notion of attacks to attacks is encompassed: only attacks whose target is an argument can be attacked, while
attacks whose target is another attack cannot be attacked in turn. In short, only one level of attacks to attacks is allowed.
Referring to Fig. 1, only the attack originated from P can be represented, while the one originated from N cannot.
We recall brieﬂy the main deﬁnitions of EAF formalism.
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 R # Args  Args;
 D # Args  R;
 if (X, (Y,Z)), (X0, (Z,Y)) 2 D then (X,X0), (X0,X) 2 R.Deﬁnition 21. Let hArgs,R,Di be an EAF and S # Args. Then
 A defeatS B iff (A,B) 2 R and 9=C 2 S s.t. (C, (A,B)) 2 D. We write A?S B to denote that A defeatS B, and A9S B to denote that A
does not defeatS B;
 S is conﬂict-free iff "A,B 2 S: if (A,B) 2 R, then (B,A) R R and $C 2 S s.t. (C, (A,B)) 2 D;
 RS = {X1?S Y1, . . . ,Xn?S Yn} is a reinstatement set for C?S B iff:
1. C?S B 2 RS,
2. for i = 1, . . . ,n, Xi 2 S,
3. "X?S Y 2 RS, "Y0 s.t. (Y0, (X,Y)) 2 D, there is a X0 ?S Y0 2 RS.
 A 2 Args is acceptable w.r.t. S, iff "B s.t. B?S A, there is a C 2 S s.t. C?S B and there is a reinstatement set for C?S B.
Semantics notions for EAF paralleling Dung’s ones are proposed in [11].
Deﬁnition 22. Let S be a conﬂict-free subset of Args in hArgs,R,Di. Then:
 S is an admissible extension iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S.
 S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension.
 S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S.
 S is a stable extension iff "B R S, $A 2 S s.t. A defeatS B.
Differently from the case of AF, in EAF the characteristic function is deﬁned on conﬂict-free sets only and is used to deﬁne
grounded semantics.
Deﬁnition 23. Let K = hArgs,R,Di be an EAF, S # Args, and 2ArgsC denote the set of all conﬂict-free subset of Args. The
characteristic function FK: 2ArgsC´ 2Args is deﬁned as FK(S) = {AjA is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
In EAF the grounded semantics is deﬁned only for ﬁnitary EAFs.
Deﬁnition 24. hArgs,R,Di is ﬁnitary iff "A 2 Args, the set {Bj(B,A) 2 R} is ﬁnite, and "(A,B) 2 R, the set {Cj(C, (A,B)) 2 D} is
ﬁnite.Deﬁnition 25. Let K be a ﬁnitary EAF and F0K ¼ ;; Fiþ1K ¼ FK(FiK)). Then
S1
i¼0ðFiKÞ is the grounded extension of K.
It is possible to draw a direct correspondence from EAF to AFRA.
Deﬁnition 26 (AFRA–EAF correspondence). For any EAF K = hArgs,R,Di we deﬁne the corresponding AFRA KR = hArgs,R [ Di.
Apart from this formal correspondence at the deﬁnition level, four main points are worth remarking to compare EAF and
AFRA.
First, as already remarked, EAF encompasses only attacks to attacks between arguments rather than the general issue of
making any attack defeasible. In [20] an extension of EAF (called EAF+) has been devised which allows for recursive attacks,
while attempting to follow as close as possible the original EAF deﬁnitions: it was shown that the AFRA formalism is able to
cover also EAF+.
A second issue concerns the notion of conﬂict-free set given in Deﬁnition 21 and a constraint on the attack relation in
Deﬁnition 20. Consider the following simple example.
Example 4. Let K = hArgs,R,Di s.t. Args = {A,B,C}, R = {(A,B)}, D = {(C, (A,B))}. Then, {A,B,C} is a conﬂict-free set.
Let us add now the relation (B,A) in R.
Example 5. Let K = hArgs,R,Di s.t. Args = {A,B,C}, R = {(A,B), (B,A)}, D = {(C, (A,B))}. Then, {A,B,C} is not a conﬂict-free set.
Suppose then that there is an argument C0 which attacks the attack (B,A) but it is not the case that C and C0 attack each
other (this situation is illustrated in Fig. 6). Note that the third requirement of Deﬁnition 20 is violated, therefore this case is
not compatible with the EAF deﬁnition. While this restriction is justiﬁed in the context of preference modelling, where EAF
has been conceived, it may turn out to be a limitation in other areas. Note anyway that even if this constraint was relaxed, by
Deﬁnition 21 the set S = {A,B,C,C0} would not be conﬂict-free due to the mutual attack between A and B. However, coherently
with other situations, S should be conﬂict-free since no argument in S defeatS another element in S.
Fig. 6. A situation forbidden in EAF.
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free.
The third issue concerns the fact that the EAF characteristic function is not monotonic in general, while it is monotonic in
the special cases4 of Hierarchical Extended Argumentation Framework (HEAF), and Preference Symmetric Extended Argumen-
tation Framework (psEAF). In the HEAF the sets Args and R are partitioned in different levels which are ordered: any attack to
attack can only start from a higher level than the one which contains the attacked attack. In the psEAF only attacks between
symmetrically attacking arguments can be attacked by arguments expressing preferences.
These limitations do not apply to AFRA where (as in AF) the characteristic function is monotonic (Proposition 3), ensuring
further desirable properties at the semantics level.
The fourth point regards the fact that, as remarked in [11], in general it does not hold that the grounded extension is the
least complete extension: as a consequence, it is not guaranteed to be included in any complete extension nor, in particular,
in any preferred extension.
Example 6 (From [11]). Consider K = hArgs,R,Di s.t. Args = {A,B,C}, R = {(B,A), (C,B)}, D = {(B, (C,B))} (see Fig. 7). The ‘‘self-
reinstating argument” B is overlooked by Deﬁnition 25: FK1 = {C}, FK2 = {C,A}, FK3 = {C,A} leading to the inclusion of A in the
grounded extension {C,A}. Deﬁnition 22 gives rise to a different scenario where {C}, {C,A} and {C,B} are admissible, and {C,A},
{C,B} are the preferred extensions. Hence, only C is included in all preferred extensions while A is not.
Consider instead the example of Fig. 7 as formalised in AFRA, i.e. C ¼ hA;Ri s.t. A ¼ fA;B; Cg and R ¼ fa; b; cg, where
a = (B,A), b = (C,B), and c = (B, (C,B)). There are two preferred extensions, namely P1(C) = {C,B,c,a} and P2(C) = {C,A,b}, while
the grounded extension is {C}.
Therefore, the grounded semantics of EAF is not in correspondence with the grounded semantics of AFRA, and a ‘‘classical”
relation between semantics notions does not hold in EAF.
8.2. The Higher Order Argumentation Framework
In the context of reasoning about coalitions, a formalism encompassing attacks to attacks called Higher Order Argumen-
tation Framework (HOAF) has been considered [15,16].
We recall literally the rather articulated deﬁnition of HOAF from [16].
Deﬁnition 27. A Higher Order Argumentation Framework (HOAF) is a tuple hAC ;A;not;A#;#i where AC is a set of coalition
arguments, A is a set of arguments such that jAj ¼ jAC j; not is a bijection from AC to A; A# is a set of arguments that
coalitions attacks attack each other, and ## ðAC AÞ [ ðA A#Þ [ ðA# ACÞ [ ðA# A#Þ is a binary relation on the set of
arguments such that for a 2 AC and b 2 A we have a#b if and only if b = not(a), and for each a 2 A#, there is precisely one
b 2 A such that b#a and precisely one c 2 AC [ A# such that a#c. A higher order argumentation framework
hAC ;A;not;A#;#i represents hA;!i if and only if A ¼ AC [ A [A#. The extensions of hAC ;A;not;A#;#i are the extensions
of the represented argumentation framework.
In HOAF attacks to attacks are not explicitly represented. In fact, the attack relation # is not recursive and relates the ele-
ments of three distinct sets, namelyAC ; A, andA#. The intuitive meaning of these three sets can be appreciated by regarding
a HOAF as the result of a translation of an argumentation framework with recursive attacks into an AF,5 where AC represents
the set of arguments and A# the set of attacks. In fact for each element A of AC a corresponding element not(A) representing4 The notions of HEAF and psEAF and the relevant results are provided in [11].
5 Note that this kind of representation was also introduced in [10] as an approach to rewrite an EAF as a traditional AF.
Fig. 7. Example about the relation between grounded and preferred semantics in EAF.
Fig. 8. Bob’s last minute dilemma formalised by a HOAF.
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represent attacks of the original argumentation framework with recursive attacks: each of these attacks has a source argument
belonging to AC and a target which is either an argument in AC or another attack in A#. Then:
 for each element A of AC , it is assumed that not(A) attacks in HOAF (through #) all elements of A# whose source is A;
 each element of A# attacks in HOAF (through #) its target, either belonging to AC (if it is an argument) or to A# (if it is
another attack).
Finally, by simply treatingAC [ A [A# as an undistinguished set of arguments, ignoring the not relation and using # as an
attack relation, a HOAF can be regarded as a traditional AF and the relevant semantics notions are deﬁned.
It emerges from the above discussion that, given a HOAF, a corresponding AFRA can be deﬁned by considering only ele-
ments of AC as arguments and applying a sort of inversion of the implicit translation procedure, as proposed in Deﬁnition 28.
Deﬁnition 28. For any  ¼ hAC ;A;not;A#;#i we deﬁne the corresponding AFRA  R ¼ hAC ;Ri s.t. ða;VÞ 2 R if and only if
ða;VÞ represents (b,c) 2 #. ða;VÞ 2 R is said to represent (b,c) 2 # if either of the following conditions holds: b 2 A#; ðnotðAÞ; bÞ 2 #; c 2 AC and V ¼ c;
 b 2 A#; ðnotðAÞ; bÞ 2 #; c 2 A# and $(c,d) 2 # such that V represents (c,d).
From Deﬁnition 28 it emerges that any HOAF can be reduced to an AFRA while the (implicit) translation algorithm pre-
viously described can be used to translate an AFRA into a HOAF. Hence the two formalisms feature the same expressive-
ness, AFRA providing however a simpler and cleaner representation and not requiring in particular the use of the additional
‘‘not” arguments. Semantics notions are directly introduced in the AFRA formalism and shown to satify desirable properties
in relation to the representation of attacks to attacks while semantics notions in HOAF are indirectly introduced with ref-
erence to a ‘‘represented AF”, and are not accompanied by such an analysis nor by the statement of reference
requirements.
To exemplify, let us consider the Bob’s last minute dilemma formalised by an HOAF and shown in Fig. 8.
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fnotðAÞ;notðNÞ;notðPÞ;notðCÞ;notðGÞg; A# ¼ fC  G;G C; P  ðC  GÞ, N  (P  (C  G)), A  N} and # = {(A,not(A)),
(not(A),A  N), (A  N,N), (N,not(N)), (not(N),N  (P  (C  G))), (N  (P  (C  G)), P  (C  G)), (P,not(P)), (not(P),P 
(C  G)), (P  (C  G),C  G), (C,not(C)), (not(C),C  G), (C  G,G), (G,not(G)), (not(G),G  C), (G  C,C)}.
The only complete, grounded, preferred, stable, semi-stable, ideal extension, according to Deﬁnition 27 is
{A,P,G,not(N),not(C),A  N,P  (C  G),G  C}.
Further investigation of the relations between HOAF and AFRA is an interesting direction of future work.
9. Conclusion and future works
AFRA is a novel abstract argumentation formalism encompassing unlimited attacks to attacks in a quite simple formal
setting and satisfying a set of basic requirements mainly concerning relationships with Dung’s original AF. While direct cor-
respondences between AFRA and AF are achieved at several levels, as shown in the paper, we remark that AFRA represents a
signiﬁcant conceptual advancement by regarding attacks as defeasible entities themselves. This enables the representation
of situations where some kind of reasoning about attacks is carried out, whose usefulness is suggested by several recent
works in the literature. In particular, meta-argumentation [21,22] represents a promising research area where defeasibility
of attacks may play a signiﬁcant role as a useful modelling tool. Currently a full-ﬂedged formalization of reasoning contexts
where recursive attacks are required can be regarded as an important future research task: apart the issue of meta-argumen-
tation mentioned above, a detailed analysis has been carried out up to now only for the case of reasoning about preferences
in [11] where just one level of recursion is considered.
Independently of the actual representation needs of speciﬁc reasoning contexts, it can be remarked that AFRA, while pur-
suing a high generality in the deﬁnition of recursive attacks, achieves at the same time the goal of providing a simpler for-
malism than other (even less expressive) proposals. In fact other approaches to represent attacks to attacks in the literature
appear to resort to somewhat more complicated formal structures and their semantics properties are still to be analyzed in
detail and/or reveal a looser correspondence with Dung’s ones, as discussed in Section 8. AFRA appears anyway to be able to
encompass these formalisms while, by explicit design choice, it does not cover more radical departures from Dung frame-
work, where the notion of recursive attacks is combined with those of argument strength or of joint and disjunctive attack
[17,23,24]. Analyzing their relationships with AFRA represents an interesting direction of future work.
As to actual implementation in software tools, AFRA has recently been included in ASPARTIX6, a software tool for imple-
menting argumentation frameworks using Answer Set Programming. As stated in [25,26] this approach uses a ﬁxed logic pro-
gram which is capable of computing the different forms of extension from a given framework which is given as input. Due to
this simple architecture, the system is easily extensible and suitable for rapid prototyping. This shows that, by its simplicity, the
AFRA formalism lends itself to rather straightforward implementation. As to computational complexity, the results in Sections 6
and 7 suggest that the many already known results for AF can be applied to AFRA too.
On the application side, we have mentioned in the paper several contexts where recursive attacks can be useful. The area
of modelling articulated decision processes involving reasoning with values is particularly interesting as it has been the sub-
ject of detailed analysis leading to the proposal of the Value-Based Argumentation Framework (VAF) [4,27]. From this per-
spective an analysis of the relationships between AFRA and VAF provides a signiﬁcant direction of future work: some
preliminary results are provided in [28].
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